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Rent-seeking is an economic phenomenon that economic agents carry on the 
unproductive activities to seek the economic interest in economic society. Rent-seeking 
activity includes: lobbying campaign for seeking the privilege and preferential benefit, the 
money power transaction, tax evasion, smuggling puts and other illegal activities etc. 
Rent-seeking is unproductive, which wastes the social resources, inhabits the fair 
competition, hinders the institutional innovation, even its prevalence will result in the low 
efficiency of social resources and loss of welfare. In the process to construct our social 
market economy, there have been a large number of rent-seeking activities, especially those 
happen in tax area are more prominent. 
Rent-seeking is a complex phenomenon in social economy, which has its own unique 
historical and social cultural background. The greatest harm of rent-seeking activity is that it 
doesn’t only lead to the defined objective deviation and efficiency reduction in the tax 
operation system, but also results in corruption and hinders the normal and orderly 
development of the national economy which affects the construction of the harmonious 
society. So, the problem how to prevent, reduce even eliminate the rent-seeking in tax 
collection area, to avoid corruption, to construct a new harmonious tax collection and 
management system and achieve the objective for tax in compliance with law, has become 
the most important task in our tax administration work. The purpose of this paper is from the 
perspective of tax authorities to employ some basic economic tools such as rent-seeking 
theory and cost-benefit analysis, to analyze the current rent-seeking problem in tax 
enforcement area, and provide some suggestions to prevent the rent-seeking. 
This paper is divided into four parts: the first chapter introduces the background and 
significance of our study, briefly overviews the study status about rent-seeking in tax, and 
defines the central content and research mentality of this paper; the second part presents the 
theoretical basis, through some recent typical cases about tax corruption, reveals the closed 
relationship between rent-seeking and tax corruption, sums up the characteristics of 
rent-seeking in tax administration, then points out the impact and harm of rent-seeking; the 
third part provides the gambling analysis on the behavior motivations between rent-seeking 















behaviors in tax from the quantitative perspective; at the last chapter, we put forward some 
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